OPPOSITION No B 2 621 764
Accell Nederland B.V., Industrieweg 4, 8444 AR Heerenveen, The Netherlands (opponent), represented by Merkenbureau Knijff & Partners B.V., Leeuwenveldseweg 12, 1382 Weesp, The Netherlands (professional representative)
a g a i n s t
Orbea S. Coop. Ltda., Pol. Ind. Goitondo 48, 48269 Mallabia (Bizkaia), Spain (applicant), represented by Jose Ramon Trigo S.L., Gran Via 40 6º 2, 28013 Madrid, Spain (professional representative).
On 28/07/2017, the Opposition Division takes the following
DECISION:
1. Opposition No B 2 621 764 is partially upheld, namely for the following contested goods and services:
Class 12: Vehicles; apparatus for locomotion by land; frames for bicycles, cycles; mopeds; motorbikes.
Class 25: Clothing; footwear; headgear; clothing, footwear and headgear for cycling.
Class 35: Wholesaling of vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and of bicycles; retailing in shops of vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and of bicycles; sale via global computer networks of vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and of bicycles.
2. European Union trade mark application No 14 408 769 is rejected for all the above goods and services. It may proceed for the remaining services.
3. Each party bears its own costs.
REASONS:
The opponent filed an opposition against all the goods and services of European Union trade mark application No 14 408 769. The opposition is based on European Union trade mark registration No 5 165 865. The opponent invoked Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR.
PROOF OF USE
In accordance with Article 42(2) and (3) EUTMR (in the version in force at the time of filing of the opposition), if the applicant so requests, the opponent must furnish proof that, during the five-year period preceding the date of publication of the contested trade mark, the earlier trade mark has been put to genuine use in the territories in which it is protected in connection with the goods or services for which it is registered and which the opponent cites as justification for its opposition, or that there are proper reasons for non-use. The earlier mark is subject to the use obligation if, at that date, it has been registered for at least five years.
The same provision states that, in the absence of such proof, the opposition will be rejected.
The applicant requested that the opponent submit proof of use of the trade mark on which the opposition is based, namely European Union trade mark registration No 5 165 865.
The request was submitted in due time and is admissible as the earlier trade mark was registered more than five years prior to the relevant date mentioned above.
The contested application was published on 08/09/2015. The opponent was therefore required to prove that the trade mark on which the opposition is based was put to genuine use in the European Union from 08/09/2010 to 07/09/2015 inclusive.
Furthermore, the evidence must show use of the trade marks for the goods on which the opposition is based, namely the following:
Class 12: Apparatus for locomotion by land, air or water, in particular bicycles; parts of bicycles.
Class 28: Games and playthings; gymnastic and sporting articles not included in other classes.
According to Rule 22(3) EUTMIR, the evidence of use must consist of indications concerning the place, time, extent and nature of use of the opposing trade mark for the goods and services in respect of which it is registered and on which the opposition is based.
On 05/07/2016, according to Rule 22(2) EUTMIR, the Office gave the opponent until 10/09/2016 to submit evidence of use of the earlier trade mark; this deadline was extended at the opponent’s request until 10/11/2016. On 10/11/2016, within the time limit, the opponent submitted evidence of use.
The evidence to be taken into account is the following:
- Affidavit of Mr Kuper, Managing Director of Accell Nederland B.V., stating that the trade mark ‘LOEKIE’ was first used in 1981 in the Netherlands when it was first registered as a trade mark in Benelux, Germany and France. In 2006, the opponent commenced use of the trade mark for children’s bikes, having a substantial number of dealers in the Netherlands and Belgium.
Attached to the witness statements are the following exhibits:
- A table originating from the opponent with information about the sales of LOEKIE products during 2010-2015 in the Netherlands and Belgium.
- Five invoices dated from 2010 to 2015 and addressed to clients in Holland and Belgium in relation to, inter alia, LOEKIE products.
- Extracts from catalogues for LOEKIE bikes for each year between 2010 and 2014, in which the mark is clearly visible on the products.
- Advertisements in which the mark ‘LOEKIE’ appears for a ‘playmobil’ event and for the sale of tickets for a monkey part. The documents are dated 2010 and 2013.
- A document from the opponent with a list of the dealers for its products in Belgium and the Netherlands.
- A document from the opponent with the price list of LOEKIE products for 2014.
- Two invoices, dated 2011 and 2013, in relation to ‘LOEKIE brochure’ of 2012 and ‘LOEKIE magazine’, respectively. According to the opponent’s explanation (since the documents are not in the language of the proceedings), the invoices relate to the costs of printing the brochure and magazine.
The applicant argues that the affidavit originates from the opponent and not from an independent source and therefore should be accorded less weight.
In this regard, Rule 22(4) EUTMIR expressly mentions written statements referred to in Article 78(1)(f) EUTMR as admissible means of proof of use. Article 78(1)(f) EUTMR lists means of giving evidence, amongst which are sworn or affirmed written statements or other statements that have a similar effect according to the law of the State in which they have been drawn up. As far as the probative value of this kind of evidence is concerned, statements drawn up by the interested parties themselves or their employees are generally given less weight than independent evidence. This is because the perception of the party involved in the dispute may be more or less affected by its personal interests in the matter.
However, this does not mean that such statements do not have any probative value at all.
The final outcome depends on the overall assessment of the evidence in the particular case. This is because, in general, further evidence is necessary to establish use, since such statements have to be considered as having less probative value than physical evidence (labels, packaging, etc.) or evidence originating from independent sources.
Bearing in mind the foregoing, it is necessary to assess the remaining evidence to see whether or not the contents of the declaration are supported by the other items of evidence.
The applicant argues that not all the items of evidence indicate genuine use in terms of time, place, extent, nature and use of the goods for which the earlier mark is registered.
The applicant’s argument is based on an individual assessment of each item of evidence regarding all the relevant factors. However, when assessing genuine use, the Opposition Division must consider the evidence in its entirety. Even if some relevant factors are lacking in some items of evidence, the combination of all the relevant factors in all the items of evidence may still indicate genuine use.
The invoices, the extracts from catalogues and the list of dealers, together with the affidavit, show that the place of use is the Netherlands and Belgium. This can be inferred from the languages of the documents and some addresses in Belgium and in the Netherlands. Therefore, the evidence relates to the relevant territory.
All the evidence is dated within the relevant period (with the exception of the first invoice).
As regards the extent of use, all the relevant facts and circumstances must be taken into account, including the nature of the relevant goods or services and the characteristics of the market concerned, the territorial extent of use, its commercial volume, duration and frequency.
The assessment of genuine use entails a degree of interdependence between the factors taken into account. Thus, the fact that commercial volume achieved under the mark was not high may be offset by the fact that use of the mark was extensive or very regular, and vice versa. Likewise, the territorial scope of the use is only one of several factors to be taken into account, so that a limited territorial scope of use can be counteracted by a more significant volume or duration of use.
The documents filed, in particular the invoices, supported by the product catalogues, advertisements and the table containing information about the sales of ‘LOEKIE’ products, provide the Opposition Division with sufficient information concerning the commercial volume, the territorial scope and the duration and frequency of use.
The invoices issued by the opponent, although not numerous, relate to the full duration of the relevant period and demonstrate the frequency of use of the mark during that period. Although the evidence does not indicate a particularly high commercial volume of use, it demonstrates that sales of goods offered under the earlier mark were made to various clients in the Netherlands and Belgium. The invoices have been submitted merely as examples of sales and do not represent the total amount of sales of goods under the earlier mark realised by the opponent during the relevant period. Use of the mark need not be quantitatively significant for it to be deemed genuine. Therefore, it is clear from the evidence submitted that the opponent distributed or provided goods under the sign ‘LOEKIE’ in the relevant market, and this gives the Opposition Division sufficient information regarding the commercial activities of the opponent throughout the relevant period. In any case, the documents prove that use of the mark has been more than merely token.
Therefore, the Opposition Division considers that the opponent has provided sufficient indications concerning the extent of the use of the earlier mark.
According to Article 15(1), second subparagraph, point (a) EUTMR, the following shall also constitute use within the meaning of paragraph 1: use of the European Union trade mark in a form differing in elements which do not alter the distinctive character of the mark in the form in which it was registered, regardless of whether or not the trade mark in the form as used is also registered in the name of the proprietor. When examining the use of an earlier registration for the purposes of Article 42(2) and (3) EUTMR, Article 15 may be applied by analogy to assess whether or not the use of the sign constitutes genuine use of the earlier mark as far as its nature is concerned.
In the present case, earlier European Union trade mark registration No 5 165 865 is for the word mark ‘LOEKIE’. The use shown by the opponent relates to the mark as registered but also demonstrates use as next to the photographs of the products depicted in the catalogues submitted, and in other forms. However, the depiction of the mark as such does not affect the distinctive character of the word mark ‘LOEKIE’ as registered, as the word as such is distinctive in relation to bikes; therefore, the distinctiveness lies in the word as such and not its specific depiction. In the various different formats in which the mark is used, the word is always clearly legible and the graphic depiction merely decorative; therefore, it does not change the distinctiveness of the mark. Therefore, it constitutes use of the mark under Article 15 EUTMR.
The Court of Justice has held that there is ‘genuine use’ of a mark where it is used in accordance with its essential function, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services for which it is registered, in order to create or preserve an outlet for those goods or services. Genuine use does not include token use for the sole purpose of preserving the rights conferred by the mark. Furthermore, the condition of genuine use of the mark requires that the mark, as protected in the relevant territory, be used publicly and outwardly (11/03/2003, C-40/01, Minimax, EU:C:2003:145, and 12/03/2003, T-174/01, Silk Cocoon, EU:T:2003:68).
Taking into account the evidence in its entirety, although the evidence submitted by the opponent is not particularly exhaustive, it does reach the minimum level necessary to establish genuine use of the earlier trade mark during the relevant period in the relevant territory.
However, the evidence filed by the opponent does not show genuine use of the trade mark for all the goods covered by it. The evidence refers only to bicycles, while there are no documents showing use for other goods for which the earlier mark is registered.
According to case-law, when applying the abovementioned provision the following should be considered:
…if a trade mark has been registered for a category of goods or services which is sufficiently broad for it to be possible to identify within it a number of sub-categories capable of being viewed independently, proof that the mark has been put to genuine use in relation to a part of those goods or services affords protection, in opposition proceedings, only for the sub-category or sub-categories to which the goods or services for which the trade mark has actually been used belong. However, if a trade mark has been registered for goods or services defined so precisely and narrowly that it is not possible to make any significant sub-divisions within the category concerned, then the proof of genuine use of the mark for the goods or services necessarily covers the entire category for the purposes of the opposition.
Although the principle of partial use operates to ensure that trade marks which have not been used for a given category of goods are not rendered unavailable, it must not, however, result in the proprietor of the earlier trade mark being stripped of all protection for goods which, although not strictly identical to those in respect of which he has succeeded in proving genuine use, are not in essence different from them and belong to a single group which cannot be divided other than in an arbitrary manner. The Court observes in that regard that in practice it is impossible for the proprietor of a trade mark to prove that the mark has been used for all conceivable variations of the goods concerned by the registration. Consequently, the concept of ‘part of the goods or services’ cannot be taken to mean all the commercial variations of similar goods or services but merely goods or services which are sufficiently distinct to constitute coherent categories or sub-categories.
(14/07/2005, T-126/03, Aladin, EU:T:2005:288).
In the present case, the evidence proves use only for bicycles. These goods can be considered to form an objective subcategory of the goods for which the trade mark is registered in Class 12. Therefore, the Opposition Division considers that the evidence shows genuine use of the trade mark only for:
Class 12: Bicycles.
Therefore, the Opposition Division will only consider the abovementioned goods in its further examination of the opposition.
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION – ARTICLE 8(1)(b) EUTMR
A likelihood of confusion exists if there is a risk that the public might believe that the goods or services in question, under the assumption that they bear the marks in question, come from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from economically linked undertakings. Whether a likelihood of confusion exists depends on the appreciation in a global assessment of several factors, which are interdependent. These factors include the similarity of the signs, the similarity of the goods and services, the distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the distinctive and dominant elements of the conflicting signs and the relevant public.
- The goods and services
The goods on which the opposition is based are the following:
Class 12: Bicycles.
The contested goods and services are the following:
Class 12: Vehicles; apparatus for locomotion by land; frames for bicycles, cycles; mopeds; motorbikes.
Class 25: Clothing; footwear; headgear; clothing, footwear and headgear for cycling.
Class 35: Advertising; business management; business administration; office functions; wholesaling of vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and of bicycles and mopeds in particular, and of parts, fittings and spare parts for vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and for bicycles and mopeds in particular; retailing in shops of vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and of bicycles and mopeds in particular, and of parts, fittings and spare parts for vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and for bicycles and mopeds in particular; business representation relating to the sale and marketing of vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and of bicycles and mopeds in particular, and of parts, fittings and spare parts for vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and for bicycles and mopeds in particular; import and export of vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and of bicycles and mopeds in particular, and of parts, fittings and spare parts for vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and for bicycles and mopeds in particular; sale via global computer networks of vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and of bicycles and mopeds in particular, and of parts, fittings and spare parts for vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and for bicycles and mopeds in particular.
An interpretation of the wording of the list of goods and services is required to determine the scope of protection of these goods and services.
The term ‘in particular’, used in the applicant’s list of services, indicates that the specific services are only examples of items included in the category and that protection is not restricted to them. In other words, it introduces a non-exhaustive list of examples (see the judgment of 09/04/2003, T-224/01, Nu-Tride, EU:T:2003:107).
The relevant factors relating to the comparison of the goods or services include, inter alia, the nature and purpose of the goods or services, the distribution channels, the sales outlets, the producers, the method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or complementary to each other.
Contested goods in Class 12
The contested apparatus for locomotion by land; vehicles include, as a broader category, the opponent’s bicycles. Since the Opposition Division cannot dissect ex officio the broad category of the contested goods, they are considered identical to the opponent’s goods.
The contested frames for bicycles, cycles are similar to the opponent’s bicycles. The applicant’s bicycle parts and accessories are essential for the normal use of bicycles. Therefore, the public may expect these goods to be produced by, or at least under the control of, the manufacturer of the assembled bicycles. For example, even if these parts and accessories are manufactured by a subcontractor, as is common in at least part of the industry, they are often branded with the mark of the bicycle manufacturer, which, in the eyes of the end user, is a factor that suggests that the goods are complementary. Furthermore, these goods target the same public, are sold via the same distribution channels and, to some extent, are produced by the same undertakings.
The opponent’s bicycles are two-wheeled vehicles that can be used for leisure as well as a means of transport to avoid traffic when going to work, in a similar way to the contested motorbikes and mopeds. Therefore, these contested goods are in competition with the opponent’s goods, especially considering the increasing number of electric bicycles, and they have the same purpose. They also have the same end users. Therefore, the goods are similar.
Contested goods in Class 25
The opponent’s goods are bicycles. The contested goods include clothing and headgear items and shoes to be used in part for bicycle activities or bicycle sports. The goods under comparison have different natures and purposes, but there is a strong complementary link between them. In addition, these goods are available next to each other in the same shops and have the same consumers. They may also come from the same undertakings. Therefore, there is a low degree of similarity between bicycles and the contested clothing; footwear; headgear; clothing, footwear and headgear for cycling.
Contested services in Class 35
Retail/wholesale services concerning the sale of particular goods are similar to a low degree to those particular goods. Although the nature, purpose and method of use of these goods and services are not the same, they have some similarities, as they are complementary and the services are generally offered in the same places where the goods are offered for sale. Furthermore, they target the same public.
The contested wholesaling of vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and of bicycles; retailing in shops of vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and of bicycles; sale via global computer networks of vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and of bicycles are similar to a low degree to the opponent’s bicycles.
Wholesaling mopeds in particular, and of parts, fittings and spare parts for vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and for mopeds in particular; retailing in shops of mopeds in particular, and of parts, fittings and spare parts for vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and for mopeds in particular; sale via global computer networks of mopeds in particular, and of parts, fittings and spare parts for vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and for bicycles and mopeds in particular and the opponent’s bicycles are not similar. Apart from being different in nature, since services are intangible whereas goods are tangible, they serve different needs. Retail/wholesale services consist in bringing together, and offering for sale, a wide variety of different products, thus allowing consumers to conveniently satisfy different shopping needs at one stop. This is not the purpose of goods. Furthermore, goods and services have different methods of use and are neither in competition nor complementary.
Similarity between retail services of specific goods covered by one mark and specific goods covered by another mark can only be found where the goods involved in the retail/wholesale services and the specific goods covered by the other mark are identical. This condition is not fulfilled in the present case since the goods at issue are only similar.
However, the contested advertising; business management; business administration; office functions; business representation relating to the sale and marketing of vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and of bicycles and mopeds in particular, and of parts, fittings and spare parts for vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and for bicycles and mopeds in particular belong to the categories of business services that have the purpose of supporting or helping other entities to do or improve their business. The contested services and the opponent’s goods have different natures, purposes, distribution channels and usual origins. Furthermore, they are neither in competition nor complementary. The mere fact that the goods may appear in advertisements is insufficient for finding a similarity. Therefore, the contested services are dissimilar to the opponent’s goods.
The contested import and export of vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and of bicycles and mopeds in particular, and of parts, fittings and spare parts for vehicles and apparatus for locomotion by land in general, and for bicycles and mopeds in particular relate to the movement of goods and normally require the involvement of customs authorities in both the country of import and the country of export. These services are often subject to import quotas, tariffs and trade agreements. As they are classified in Class 35, they are considered business administration services and do not relate to the actual retailing or wholesaling of the goods (commercial functions). For these reasons, goods themselves are considered dissimilar to import and export services for those goods.
- Relevant public — degree of attention
The average consumer of the category of products concerned is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s degree of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question.
In the present case, the goods and services found to be identical or similar to different degrees are directed at both the public at large and at business customers with specific professional knowledge or expertise. The degree of attention may vary from average to high, depending on the price of the goods and of the services offered.
- The signs
LOEKIE
|
LOKI
|
Earlier trade mark |
Contested sign |
The relevant territory is the European Union.
The global appreciation of the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the marks in question must be based on the overall impression given by the marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components (11/11/1997, C-251/95, Sabèl, EU:C:1997:528, § 23).
The earlier mark is a word mark, ‘LOEKIE’.
The contested sign is a word mark, ‘LOKI’.
Each mark consists of only one component, and their inherent distinctiveness is normal in relation to the relevant goods and services. This is because they have no meaning in the relevant languages. In addition, they have no element that could be considered more dominant (visually eye-catching) than other elements.
Visually, the signs coincide in the sequence of letters ‘LO*KI*’, which represent the first and second letters in both signs, and then the fourth and fifth letters in the earlier mark and the third and fourth letters in the contested mark. The signs differ in the letters ‘E’ at the middle and end of the earlier sign, which have no counterparts in the contested mark. Given the similar lengths (six letters versus four letters) and similar structures of the signs, it is considered that the signs are visually similar to an average degree.
This finding is also supported by the fact that the first parts of the conflicting marks are identical. Consumers generally tend to focus on the first element of a sign when being confronted with a trade mark. This is justified by the fact that the public reads from left to right, which makes the part placed at the left of the sign (the initial part) the one that first catches the attention of the reader.
Aurally, irrespective of the different pronunciation rules in different parts of the relevant territory, the pronunciation of the signs coincides in the sound of the letters ‘LO*KI*’. The pronunciation differs in the sounds of the middle and final letters ‘E’ of the earlier mark, which have no counterparts in the contested sign; however, in some countries such as France, this letter will not be pronounced, resulting in the marks being very similar. Therefore, in view of the above, it is considered that the signs are aurally similar to a low degree or (for the French-speaking public) a high degree.
Conceptually, neither of the signs has a meaning for the public in the relevant territory. Since a conceptual comparison is not possible, the conceptual aspect does not influence the assessment of the similarity of the signs.
As the signs have been found similar in at least one aspect of the comparison, the examination of likelihood of confusion will proceed.
- Distinctiveness of the earlier mark
The distinctiveness of the earlier mark is one of the factors to be taken into account in the global assessment of likelihood of confusion.
The opponent did not explicitly claim that its mark is particularly distinctive by virtue of intensive use or reputation.
Consequently, the assessment of the distinctiveness of the earlier mark will rest on its distinctiveness per se. In the present case, the earlier trade mark as a whole has no meaning for any of the goods in question from the perspective of the public in the relevant territory. Therefore, the distinctiveness of the earlier mark must be seen as normal.
- Global assessment, other arguments and conclusion
The contested goods and services are partly identical, partly similar to different degrees and partly dissimilar. The signs are visually similar to an average degree, aurally similar to a low degree or to a high degree (depending on the part of the relevant public) and the conceptual aspect does not influence the assessment of the similarity of the signs.
The verbal elements in the signs do not convey any differentiating concepts that will aid the relevant public in distinguishing between them. The verbal elements in the signs coincide in their beginnings, which is of particular importance for the assessment of the likelihood of confusion between the signs. In addition, their structure and overall length are similar.
Regarding certain visual differences, it must be emphasised that although the average consumer of the category of products and services concerned is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect, account is taken of the fact that average consumers rarely have the chance to make a direct comparison between different marks, but must trust in their imperfect recollection of them.
The opponent refers to previous decisions of the Office to support its arguments. However, the Office is not bound by its previous decisions as each case has to be dealt with separately and with regard to its particularities.
This practice has been fully supported by the General Court, which stated that, according to settled case-law, the legality of decisions is to be assessed purely with reference to the EUTMR, and not to the Office’s practice in earlier decisions (30/06/2004, T-281/02, Mehr für Ihr Geld, EU:T:2004:198).
Even though previous decisions of the Office are not binding, their reasoning and outcome should still be duly considered when deciding upon a particular case.
In the present case, the previous decisions referred to by the opponent are not relevant to the present proceedings. In most of these cases, the marks differ in three letters instead of two, or have additional figurative elements that render them more different and therefore not comparable to the present case.
While the Office does have a duty to exercise its powers in accordance with the general principles of European Union law, such as the principle of equal treatment and the principle of sound administration, the way in which these principles are applied must be consistent with respect to legality. It must also be emphasised that each case must be examined on its own individual merits. The outcome of any particular case will depend on specific criteria applicable to the facts of that particular case, including, for example, the parties’ assertions, arguments and submissions. Finally, a party in proceedings before the Office may not rely on, or use to its own advantage, a possible unlawful act committed for the benefit of some third party in order to secure an identical decision.
In view of the above, it follows that, even if the previous decisions submitted to the Opposition Division are to some extent factually similar to the present case, the outcome may not be the same.
Considering all the above, the Opposition Division finds that there is a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public and therefore the opposition is partly well founded on the basis of the opponent’s European Union trade mark registration.
It follows from the above that the contested trade mark must be rejected for the goods and services found to be identical or similar to different degrees to those of the earlier trade mark.
The rest of the contested services are dissimilar. As similarity of goods and services is a necessary condition for the application of Article 8(1) EUTMR, the opposition based on this article and directed at these services cannot be successful.
COSTS
According to Article 85(1) EUTMR, the losing party in opposition proceedings must bear the fees and costs incurred by the other party. According to Article 85(2) EUTMR, where each party succeeds on some heads and fails on others, or if reasons of equity so dictate, the Opposition Division will decide a different apportionment of costs.
Since the opposition is successful only for part of the contested goods and services, both parties have succeeded on some heads and failed on others. Consequently, each party has to bear its own costs.
The Opposition Division
Ferenc GAZDA
|
Cristina CRESPO MOLTO |
Michaela SIMANDLOVA |
According to Article 59 EUTMR, any party adversely affected by this decision has a right to appeal against this decision. According to Article 60 EUTMR, notice of appeal must be filed in writing at the Office within two months of the date of notification of this decision. It must be filed in the language of the proceedings in which the decision subject to appeal was taken. Furthermore, a written statement of the grounds of appeal must be filed within four months of the same date. The notice of appeal will be deemed to be filed only when the appeal fee of EUR 720 has been paid.