OPPOSITION No B 2 561 598

H. Lundbeck A/S, Ottiliavej 9, 2500 Valby, Denmark (opponent), represented by Hogan Lovells, Avenida Maisonnave 22, 03003 Alicante, Spain (professional representative)

a g a i n s t

Daiichi Sankyo Company Limited, 3-5-1, Nihonbashi Honcho, Chuo-ku, Tokyo 103 8426, Japan (applicant), represented by Zenz Patentanwälte Partnerschaft mbB, Rüttenscheider Str. 2, 45128 Essen, Germany (professional representative).

On 28/08/2017, the Opposition Division takes the following

DECISION:

1.        Opposition No B 2 561 598 is upheld for all the contested goods.

2.        European Union trade mark application No 13 807 391 is rejected in its entirety.

3.        The applicant bears the costs, fixed at EUR 650.

REASONS:

The opponent filed an opposition against all the goods of European Union trade mark application No 13 807 391 for the figurative mark. The opposition is based on, inter alia, European Union trade mark registration No 2 068 229 for the word mark ‘LUNDBECK’. The opponent invoked Articles 8(1)(b) and 8(5) EUTMR.

PROOF OF USE

In accordance with Article 42(2) and (3) EUTMR (in the version in force at the time of filing of the opposition), if the applicant so requests, the opponent must furnish proof that, during the five-year period preceding the date of publication of the contested trade mark, the earlier trade mark has been put to genuine use in the territories in which it is protected in connection with the goods or services for which it is registered and which the opponent cites as justification for its opposition, or that there are proper reasons for non-use. The earlier mark is subject to the use obligation if, at that date, it has been registered for at least five years.

The applicant states that the ‘opposition word marks ‘LUNDBECK’ are not used’ in the context of the opponent’s claim of reputation and enhanced distinctiveness of its earlier marks.

According to the Office’s practice, a request for proof of use must be explicit, unambiguous and unconditional. This is because it has important procedural consequences: if the opponent does not file proof of use, the opposition must be rejected.

Since the applicant’s statement is not an explicit, unambiguous and unconditional request for proof of use, it has not been treated as such. Therefore, the opponent was not under any obligation to submit proof that one of its earlier marks, namely European Union trade mark registration No 2 068 229, had been put to genuine use despite being subject to proof of use. The opponent’s other earlier mark was not even subject to proof of use since it had not been registered for at least five years before the date of publication of the contested trade mark.

LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION – ARTICLE 8(1)(b) EUTMR

A likelihood of confusion exists if there is a risk that the public might believe that the goods or services in question, under the assumption that they bear the marks in question, come from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from economically linked undertakings. Whether a likelihood of confusion exists depends on the appreciation in a global assessment of several factors, which are interdependent. These factors include the similarity of the signs, the similarity of the goods and services, the distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the distinctive and dominant elements of the conflicting signs and the relevant public.

The opposition is based on more than one earlier trade mark. The Opposition Division finds it appropriate to first examine the opposition in relation to the opponent’s European Union trade mark registration No 2 068 229.

1. The goods

The goods on which the opposition is based are the following:

Class 5: Pharmaceutical preparations.

The contested goods are the following:

Class 5: Pharmaceutical preparations and substances.  

Pharmaceutical preparations are identically contained in both lists of goods.

The contested pharmaceutical substances and the opponent’s pharmaceutical preparations are synonyms. Therefore, the goods are identical.

2. Relevant public — degree of attention

The average consumer of the category of products concerned is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It should also be borne in mind that the average consumer’s degree of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question.

In the present case, the goods found to be identical are directed at the public at large and at business customers with specific professional knowledge or expertise.

It is apparent from the case-law that, insofar as pharmaceutical preparations are concerned, the relevant public’s degree of attention is relatively high, whether or not issued on prescription (judgments of 15/12/2010, T-331/09, Tolposan, EU:T:2010:520, § 26; 15/03/2012, T-288/08, Zydus, EU:T:2012:124, § 36 and quoted case-law). In particular, medical professionals have a high degree of attentiveness when prescribing medicines. With regard to non-professionals, they also show a higher degree of attention, regardless of whether the pharmaceuticals are sold without prescription, as these goods affect their state of health.

3. The signs

LUNDBECK
Earlier trade mark	Contested sign

The relevant territory is the European Union.

The global appreciation of the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the marks in question must be based on the overall impression given by the marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components (11/11/1997, C-251/95, Sabèl, EU:C:1997:528, § 23).

The unitary character of the European Union trade mark means that an earlier European Union trade mark can be relied on in opposition proceedings against any application for registration of a European Union trade mark that would adversely affect the protection of the first mark, even if only in relation to the perception of consumers in part of the European Union (18/09/2008, C-514/06 P, Armafoam, EU:C:2008:511, § 57). This applies by analogy to international registrations designating the European Union. Therefore, a likelihood of confusion for only part of the relevant public of the European Union is sufficient to reject the contested application.

The common element ‘LUND’ and the signs as a whole are not meaningful in certain territories, for example, in those countries where Spanish is understood. Consequently, the Opposition Division finds it appropriate to focus the comparison of the signs on the Spanish-speaking part of the public. The applicant’s argument regarding the possible meanings of the signs is, therefore, irrelevant for this part of the relevant public.

Consumers generally tend to focus on the beginning of a sign when they encounter a trade mark. This is because the public reads from left to right, which makes the part placed at the left of the sign (the initial part) the one that first catches the attention of the reader.

Visually, the signs coincide in the initial string of letters ‘LUND’. However, they differ in the final string of four letters ‘BECK’ (earlier mark) and ‘EYNA’ (contested sign). The signs are of equal length, since both signs consist of eight letters. While the earlier mark is a word mark, the contested mark was filed as a figurative mark. However, the representation of the letters in the contested mark is rather standard.

Therefore, the signs are similar to an average degree.

Aurally, the pronunciation of the signs coincides in the sound of the first letters ‛LUND’, present identically in both signs. The pronunciation differs in the sound of the final letters ‛BECK’ of the earlier sign and ‘EYNA’ of the contested mark. While the earlier mark consists of two syllables, the contested sign has one additional syllable.

Therefore, the signs are similar to a low degree.

Conceptually, neither of the signs has a meaning for the public in the relevant territory. Since a conceptual comparison is not possible, the conceptual aspect does not influence the assessment of the similarity of the signs.

As the signs have been found similar in at least one aspect of the comparison, the examination of likelihood of confusion will proceed.

4. Distinctiveness of the earlier mark

The distinctiveness of the earlier mark is one of the factors to be taken into account in the global assessment of likelihood of confusion.

According to the opponent, the earlier mark has been extensively used and enjoys an enhanced scope of protection. However, for reasons of procedural economy, the evidence filed by the opponent to prove this claim does not have to be assessed in the present case (see below in ‘Global assessment’).

Consequently, the assessment of the distinctiveness of the earlier mark will rest on its distinctiveness per se. In the present case, the earlier trade mark as a whole has no meaning for any of the goods in question from the perspective of the public in the relevant territory. Therefore, the distinctiveness of the earlier mark must be seen as normal.

5. Global assessment, other arguments and conclusion

Evaluating likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the relevant factors and, in particular, a similarity between the marks and between the goods or services. Therefore, a lesser degree of similarity between goods and services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks and vice versa (29/09/1998, C-39/97, Canon, EU:C:1998:442, § 17).

Account is taken of the fact that average consumers rarely have the chance to make a direct comparison between different marks, but must trust in their imperfect recollection of them (22/06/1999, C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik, EU:C:1999:323, § 26).

The goods are identical and the relevant public’s degree of attention is relatively high.

However, even consumers who pay a high degree of attention need to rely on their imperfect recollection of trade marks (21/11/2013, T-443/12, ancotel, EU:T:2013:605, §  54).

The earlier mark enjoys a normal degree of distinctiveness per se.

For the Spanish-speaking public the signs are visually similar to an average degree and aurally similar to a low degree due to the coincidence in the first four letters ‘LUND-’ (which consumers will tend to focus on) and the same length of the signs.  Since neither of the signs has a meaning for the Spanish-speaking public, there are no conceptual differences that could assist Spanish-speaking consumers in safely differentiating the signs in the context of identical goods.

Likelihood of confusion covers situations where the consumer directly confuses the trade marks themselves, or where the consumer makes a connection between the conflicting signs and assumes that the goods/services covered are from the same or economically linked undertakings.

Indeed, it is highly conceivable that the relevant consumer will perceive the contested mark as a sub-brand, a variation of the earlier mark, configured in a different way according to the type of goods or services that it designates (23/10/2002, T-104/01, Fifties, EU:T:2002:262, § 49).

The applicant refers to a previous national decision to support its arguments. However, it must be noted that decisions of national courts and national offices regarding conflicts between identical or similar trade marks on the national level do not have a binding effect on the Office since the European Union trade mark regime is an autonomous system which applies independently of any national system (13/09/2010, T-292/08, Often, EU:T:2010:399).

Even though previous national decisions are not binding, their reasoning and outcome should be duly considered, particularly when the decision has been taken in the Member State that is relevant to the proceedings.

In the present case, the previous case referred to by the applicant is not relevant to the present proceedings. The reason is that the decision was taken by the Swiss Federal Institute of Intellectual Property and thus it did not focus on Spanish-speaking consumers, which the decision at hand focuses on.  

Considering all the above, there is a likelihood of confusion on the part of the Spanish-speaking part of the public. As stated above in section c) of this decision, a likelihood of confusion for only part of the relevant public of the European Union is sufficient to reject the contested application.

Therefore, the opposition is well founded on the basis of the opponent’s European Union trade mark registration No 2 068 229. It follows that the contested trade mark must be rejected for all the contested goods.

Since the opposition is successful on the basis of the inherent distinctiveness of the earlier mark, there is no need to assess the enhanced degree of distinctiveness of the opposing mark due to its reputation as claimed by the opponent. The result would be the same even if the earlier mark enjoyed an enhanced degree of distinctiveness.

As the earlier European Union trade mark registration No 2 068 229 leads to the success of the opposition and to the rejection of the contested trade mark for all the goods against which the opposition was directed, there is no need to examine the other earlier right invoked by the opponent (16/09/2004, T-342/02, Moser Grupo Media, S.L., EU:T:2004:268).

Since the opposition is fully successful on the basis of the ground of Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR, there is no need to further examine the other ground of the opposition, namely Article 8(5) EUTMR.

COSTS

According to Article 85(1) EUTMR, the losing party in opposition proceedings must bear the fees and costs incurred by the other party.

Since the applicant is the losing party, it must bear the opposition fee as well as the costs incurred by the opponent in the course of these proceedings.

According to Rule 94(3) and (6) and Rule 94(7)(d)(i) EUTMIR, the costs to be paid to the opponent are the opposition fee and the costs of representation which are to be fixed on the basis of the maximum rate set therein.

The Opposition Division

Octavio MONGE GONZALVO

Beatrix STELTER

Denitza STOYANOVA-VALCHANOVA

According to Article 59 EUTMR, any party adversely affected by this decision has a right to appeal against this decision. According to Article 60 EUTMR, notice of appeal must be filed in writing at the Office within two months of the date of notification of this decision. It must be filed in the language of the proceedings in which the decision subject to appeal was taken. Furthermore, a written statement of the grounds of appeal must be filed within four months of the same date. The notice of appeal will be deemed to be filed only when the appeal fee of EUR 720 has been paid.

The amount determined in the fixation of the costs may only be reviewed by a decision of the Opposition Division on request. According to Rule 94(4) EUTMIR, such a request must be filed within one month from the date of notification of this fixation of costs and will be deemed to be filed only when the review fee of EUR 100 (Annex I A(33) EUTMR) has been paid.