COCO24 | Decision 2509902 – Kaufland Warenhandel GmbH & Co. KG v. Petra Magyar-Evellei

OPPOSITION DIVISION
OPPOSITION No B 2 509 902
Kaufland Warenhandel GmbH & Co. KG, Rötelstr. 35, 74172 Neckarsulm,
Germany (opponent), represented by Boehmert & Boehmert
Anwaltspartnerschaft mbB – Patentanwälte Rechtsanwälte, Hollerallee 32, 28209
Bremen, Germany (professional representative)
a g a i n s t
Petra Magyar-Evellei, Korisfa u. 4. 2/5, 1188 Budapest, Hungary (applicant).
On 30/11/2017, the Opposition Division takes the following
DECISION:
1. Opposition No B 2 509 902 is rejected in its entirety.
2. The opponent bears the costs.
PRELIMINARY REMARK
As from 01/10/2017, Regulation (EC) No 207/2009 and Regulation (EC) No 2868/95
have been repealed and replaced by Regulation (EU) 2017/1001 (codification),
Delegated Regulation (EU) 2017/1430 and Implementing Regulation (EU)
2017/1431, subject to certain transitional provisions. All the references in this
decision to the EUTMR, EUTMDR and EUTMIR shall be understood as references to
the Regulations currently in force, except where expressly indicated otherwise
REASONS
The opponent filed an opposition against all the goods of European Union trade mark
application No 13 597 489 for the figurative mark , namely against all
the goods in Classes 29, 30 and 32. The opposition is based on international trade
mark registration No 1 011 239 designating the European Union for the figurative
mark . The opponent invoked Article 8(1)(b) EUTMR.

Decision on Opposition No B 2 509 902 page: 2 of 9
LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION — ARTICLE 8(1)(b) EUTMR
A likelihood of confusion exists if there is a risk that the public might believe that the
goods or services in question, under the assumption that they bear the marks in
question, come from the same undertaking or, as the case may be, from
economically linked undertakings. Whether a likelihood of confusion exists depends
on the appreciation in a global assessment of several factors, which are
interdependent. These factors include the similarity of the signs, the similarity of the
goods and services, the distinctiveness of the earlier mark, the distinctive and
dominant elements of the conflicting signs, and the relevant public.
a) The goods
The goods on which the opposition is based are the following:
Class 30: Confectionery and chocolate products, also in bar form.
The contested goods are the following:
Class 29: Coconut oil.
Class 30: Chocolate powder; cocoa products; preparations based on cocoa.
Class 32: Fruit juice beverages (non-alcoholic -).
Some of the contested goods are identical to goods on which the opposition is
based. For reasons of procedural economy, the Opposition Division will not
undertake a full comparison of the goods listed above. The examination of the
opposition will proceed as if all the contested goods were identical to those of the
earlier mark which, for the opponent, is the best light in which the opposition can be
examined.
b) Relevant public — degree of attention
The average consumer of the category of products concerned is deemed to be
reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. It should also
be borne in mind that the average consumer’s degree of attention is likely to vary
according to the category of goods or services in question.
In the present case, the goods assumed to be identical are goods of daily
consumption directed at the public at large.
The degree of attention is considered to be average.

Decision on Opposition No B 2 509 902 page: 3 of 9
c) The signs
Earlier trade mark Contested sign
The relevant territory is the European Union.
The global appreciation of the visual, aural or conceptual similarity of the marks in
question must be based on the overall impression given by the marks, bearing in
mind, in particular, their distinctive and dominant components (11/11/1997, C-251/95,
Sabèl, EU:C:1997:528, § 23).
When assessing the similarity of the signs, an analysis of whether the coinciding
components are descriptive, allusive or otherwise weak is carried out to assess the
extent to which these coinciding components have a lesser or greater capacity to
indicate commercial origin. It may be more difficult to establish that the public may be
confused about origin due to similarities that pertain solely to non-distinctive
elements.
The English word ‘COCO’, either alone (as it appears in the contested sign) or in
combination with ‘NUT’ (as it appears in the earlier mark), makes reference to the
fruit of the coconut palm or its meat
(www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/coconut;
www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/coco). This meaning will be understood
in part of the relevant territory either because the consumers understand English, or
because of the similarity with the equivalent word/s in other European languages,
such as ‘kokosnoot’ in Dutch, ‘noix de coco’ in French, ‘noce di cocco’ in Italian,
‘Kokosnuss’ in German, ‘coco’ in Spanish and Portuguese and ‘kokosnöt’ in Swedish.
All of the relevant goods can contain coconut or have a coconut flavour. In relation to
these goods, the part of the relevant public that understands the meaning of the
words ‘COCO’ and ‘COCONUT’ may perceive them as a reference to the
characteristics of the relevant goods, and therefore as descriptive.
However, for part of the relevant public, namely the Hungarian-, Greek- and Latvian-
speakers, the terms ‘COCO’ and ‘COCONUT’ are distinctive as they have no
meaning in the corresponding language and the equivalent terms in these languages,
namely ‘kókuszdió’ (Hungarian), ‘καρύδα’ (Greek) and ‘kokosrieksts’ (Latvian) are not
sufficiently similar for the consumer to perceive the words ‘COCO’ and ‘COCONUT’

 

 

 

Decision on Opposition No B 2 509 902 page: 4 of 9
as having the meaning described above and therefore being non-distinctive. Latvian
and Hungarian consumers do not pronounce the letter ‘c’ as /k/ and will therefore not
relate the elements ‘COCO’ (pronounced /tsuotsuo/ in Latvian and /tsotso/ in
Hungarian) or ‘COCONUT’ (pronounced /tsuotsuo nut/ in Latvian and /tsotso nut/ in
Hungarian) with the aforementioned equivalents in their language. In addition, the
terms ‘COCO’ and ‘COCONUT’ cannot be considered to be basic English terms that
would be understood throughout the European Union. Consequently, these terms
must be considered inherently distinctive for the Hungarian-, Greek- and Latvian-
speaking public.
The Opposition Division will therefore first examine the opposition in relation to these
parts of the public for which the words ‘COCONUT’ and ‘COCO’ have no meaning
and have a normal degree of distinctiveness, as this is the most advantageous
scenario for the opponent.
The contested mark is a figurative mark containing the word ‘COCO’ written in thin
white upper case letters in a central position with the number ‘24’ in yellow bold font
below. These verbal elements are placed in the centre of a green and white vortex.
For the reasons set out above, the element ‘COCO’ is inherently distinctive for the
Hungarian, Greek and Latvian-speaking public.
The element ‘24’ of the contested sign will be understood by that part of the relevant
public as referring to the figure it identifies. In relation to the relevant goods, it is not
directly descriptive. However, it may be perceived as alluding to these goods being
available any time (24 hours). As such, it is considered to be less distinctive for the
relevant goods.
The earlier mark is a figurative mark containing, apart from the word ‘COCONUT’ in
bold dark title case letters, a small figurative element on top that depicts two squares
and two triangles, which might be perceived as a stylised letter ‘K’ and which are
placed within an inner and an outer frame. The earlier mark also contains the word
‘CLASSIC’ written in small white title case letters within the outer frame below the
stylised letter ‘K’.
As mentioned above, the element ‘COCONUT’ is inherently distinctive for the
Hungarian-, Greek- and Latvian-speaking public.
The English word ‘CLASSIC’ of the earlier mark will be understood by the Hungarian,
Greek and Latvian-speaking part of the public in the relevant territory as meaning,
inter alia, ‘serving as a standard or model of its kind’
(www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/classic). This part of the non-English-
speaking public in the relevant territory will perceive the aforementioned meaning
because of the widespread use of the word ‘CLASSIC’ and similar equivalents in
Hungarian (klasszikus), Greek (κλασική pronounced as /klasici/) and Latvian
(klasisks). Bearing in mind that the relevant goods are all foodstuffs and beverages, it
is considered that this element has only a low, if any, distinctive character for these
goods.
The contested sign has no element which could be considered more eye-catching
and thus more dominant than other elements. In particular, the verbal elements are
depicted in the same size. Although ‘24’ is much shorter, it is depicted in bold font
and will therefore not be perceived as less important than the element ‘COCO’.

 

 

Decision on Opposition No B 2 509 902 page: 5 of 9
The word ‘COCONUT’ is the dominant element in the earlier mark, as it is the most
eye-catching in comparison with the other verbal and figurative elements which are
less noticeable due to their much smaller size.
As regards the figurative elements of the signs, it must also be borne in mind that, in
principle, the verbal components usually have a stronger impact on the consumer
than the figurative components when signs consist of both verbal and figurative
components. This is because the public does not tend to analyse signs and will more
easily refer to the signs in question by their verbal element than by describing their
figurative elements (14/07/2005, T 312/03, Selenium-Ace, EU:T:2005:289, § 37).
Visually, the signs only coincide in the letters ‘COCO’ which are equally present in
both signs. However, they differ in all other verbal and figurative elements of varying
degrees of distinctiveness. Despite the fact that verbal elements usually have a
stronger impact as mentioned above, in the present case, the visual overall
impression evoked by the signs is completely different, not only due to the additional
verbal elements but also due to the different stylisation of the signs.
The relevant consumers, when perceiving a verbal sign, will not break it down into
several elements unless these elements suggest a concrete meaning, or resemble
words that they already know (13/02/2007, T 256/04, Respicur, EU:T:2007:46, § 57;
13/02/2008, T 146/06, Aturion, EU:T:2008:33, § 58). Therefore, the relevant public
who does not attribute any meaning to ‘COCO’ is unlikely to perceive this sequence
of letters as an independent element within the earlier mark.
Therefore, it is concluded that the signs are not visually similar.
Aurally, only the verbal elements are pronounced. In the case of the earlier sign,
these are ‘K CLASSIC COCONUT’ and in the case of the contested sign ‘COCO 24’.
Accordingly, the earlier sign will be pronounced /ka tslɑʃʃits tsotso nut/ in
Hungarian, /k klas.ɪk kokonut/ in Greek and /ka tslassits tsuotsuo nut/ in Latvian while
the contested sign will be pronounced /tsotso hhusonneɟ/ in Hungarian, /koko
ikositesera/ in Greek and /tsuotsuo divdesmittʃetʀi/ in Latvian.
While the signs coincide in the sound of the letters ‘COCO’, their pronunciation differs
significantly in all other elements. Even assuming that the relevant consumer would
refer to the earlier mark just as ‘COCONUT’, the relevant consumer would therefore
still perceive clear aural differences. Apart from the differences arising from the
pronunciation of the element ‘24’, which is less distinctive as mentioned above, there
are also differences in the pronunciation of the elements ‘COCO’ and ‘COCONUT’
alone. The speech rhythm differs due to the additional syllable in the earlier sign and
the intonation shifts from the first syllable in case of ‘COCO’ to the last syllable in
case of ‘COCONUT’.
Therefore, the signs are aurally only similar to a low degree.
Conceptually, reference is made to the previous assertions concerning the semantic
content conveyed by the marks to the Hungarian, Greek and Latvian-speaking public.
The signs will be associated with a different meaning arising in the case of the earlier
mark from the element ‘CLASSIC’ and in the case of the contested sign from the
element ‘24’.
Therefore, the signs are considered to be conceptually dissimilar. However, it must
be noted that these conceptual differences will not have a great impact on the
consumer as they arise from weak elements.

Decision on Opposition No B 2 509 902 page: 6 of 9
As the signs have been found similar in at least one aspect of the comparison, the
examination of likelihood of confusion will proceed.
d) Distinctiveness of the earlier mark
The distinctiveness of the earlier mark is one of the factors to be taken into account
in the global assessment of likelihood of confusion.
The opponent did not explicitly claim that its mark is particularly distinctive by virtue
of intensive use or reputation.
Consequently, the assessment of the distinctiveness of the earlier mark will rest on its
distinctiveness per se. In the present case, from the perspective of the Hungarian,
Greek and Latvian-speaking public in the relevant territory the earlier trade mark as a
whole has no meaning for any of the goods in question. Therefore, the
distinctiveness of the earlier mark must be seen as normal, despite the presence of a
weak element in the mark, as stated above in section c) of this decision.
e) Global assessment, other arguments and conclusion
When determining the existence of likelihood of confusion, trade marks have to be
compared by making an overall assessment of the visual, aural and conceptual
similarities between the marks. The comparison must be based on the overall
impression given by the marks, bearing in mind, in particular, their distinctive and
dominant components (11/11/1997, C-251/95, Sabèl, EU:C:1997:528 § 23).
The case at hand concerns two figurative marks which only coincide in the element
‘COCO’. As set out above in section c) this common element, alone or in combination
with ‘NUT’, will be understood in many Member States of the European Union as
referring to the characteristics of the goods and will therefore be seen as non-
distinctive.
However, there are some territories, namely Hungary, Greece or Latvia, where the
words ‘COCO’ and ‘COCONUT’ will not be understood. The Opposition Division has
therefore focused its analysis on these territories where the public is most prone to
confuse the marks at issue.
The goods are assumed to be identical and the signs have been found to be visually
and conceptually dissimilar. Aurally they are only similar to a low degree. The
relevant public is the public at large displaying an average level of attention at the
time of purchase. The distinctiveness of the earlier mark must be seen as normal for
the Hungarian, Greek and Latvian-speaking public.
Evaluating likelihood of confusion implies some interdependence between the
relevant factors and, in particular, a similarity between the marks and between the
goods or services (29/09/1998, C-39/97, Canon, EU:C:1998:442, § 17). It is therefore
true that identity of the goods, as assumed in the present case, may sometimes be
sufficient to offset a lesser degree of similarity between the signs.
In this case however, even assuming that the goods are identical and accepting that
the only coinciding element enjoys a normal degree of inherent distinctiveness, the
Opposition Division holds the view that there are still sufficient differences between
the marks to enable the consumer to safely distinguish between them. In particular,

Decision on Opposition No B 2 509 902 page: 7 of 9
on a visual level, the consumer will perceive the contested sign as a whole including
the colourful figurative elements. The eye of the consumer is unlikely to be
particularly drawn to the letters ‘COCO’ which are depicted only in thin white font and
do not stand out against the green background. While the contested sign will
therefore be perceived as a complex logo, a combination of various verbal and
figurative elements, the consumer, when confronted with the earlier mark, will
primarily perceive a stylised word ‘COCONUT’ which is visually dominant. For the
reasons set out above, it will not be broken down into various elements, but will be
perceived as a whole. The relevant consumer is therefore unlikely to perceive
‘COCO’ as a separate element in the earlier sign.
In the present case, it must also be borne in mind that the relevant goods themselves
are fairly ordinary consumer products that are commonly purchased in supermarkets
or establishments where goods are arranged on shelves and consumers are guided
by the visual impact of the mark they are looking for (see in this regard judgment of
15/04/2010, T-488/07, Egléfruit, EU:T:2010:145). Therefore, the visual dissimilarity of
the signs is of particular importance in the overall assessment of a likelihood of
confusion. The aural and conceptual differences identified in section c) above, further
add to the dissimilar overall impression conveyed by the marks at issue. All of this
leads the Opposition Division to find that the relevant consumer will not confuse the
signs, even taking into account the most propitious circumstances for the opponent.
This absence of a likelihood of confusion equally applies to the part of the public for
which the elements ‘COCONUT’ and ‘COCO’ are non-distinctive. Even though these
words coincide in four letters and evoke similar ideas, for that part of the public they
do not carry any weight as trade marks in relation to the relevant goods. This is
because they will be perceived as merely describing the characteristics of the goods,
namely that the goods may contain coconut or have coconut flavour. To identify the
commercial origin of the goods the part of the public that understands the descriptive
meaning of ‘COCONUT’ and ‘COCO’ will therefore rather focus on the remaining
elements of the signs which are all different. As a result, that part of the public will
perceive the signs as being even less similar and will easily distinguish them.
For the sake of completeness, it is noted that, for this part of the public, the
assessment remains the same as regards the elements ‘CLASSIC’ and ‘24’ which will
be perceived as having the meanings described above. The English word ‘CLASSIC’
is a basic English word, commonly used throughout the EU, and there are similar
equivalents in other European languages such as French (classique), German
(klassisch), Italian (classico) or Spanish (clásico). In relation to the relevant goods,
this part of the public will therefore also perceive the elements ‘CLASSIC’ and ‘24’ as
weak.
The opponent refers to a previous decision of the Office to support its arguments,
namely to the decision of the Board of Appeal of 02/11/2016 in the Case R 182/2016-
2, Classic Coconut (fig.) / COCONUT DREAMS. However, the Office is not bound by
its previous decisions, as each case has to be dealt with separately and with regard
to its particularities.
This practice has been fully supported by the General Court, which stated that,
according to settled case-law, the legality of decisions is to be assessed purely with
reference to the EUTMR, and not to the Office’s practice in earlier decisions
(30/06/2004, T-281/02, Mehr für Ihr Geld, EU:T:2004:198).
Even though previous decisions of the Office are not binding, their reasoning and
outcome should still be duly considered when deciding upon a particular case.

Decision on Opposition No B 2 509 902 page: 8 of 9
The previous case referred to by the opponent is not relevant to the present
proceedings. Unlike in the present case, the contested sign was a word mark
including the same verbal element at the beginning of the sign which dominates the
earlier mark, namely ‘Coconut’. The signs were found to be visually and aurally
similar and no conceptual aspects were taken into account. In that case, the
differences were not considered sufficient to exclude the existence of a likelihood of
confusion. This is, however, different in the case at hand where the contested mark is
a highly stylised figurative mark containing the word ‘COCO’ (not ‘Coconut’). As set
out above, the signs are visually dissimilar and only similar to a low degree from a
phonetic point of view. Although less relevant, there are also some conceptual
differences between the signs. It is therefore not true, as the opponent argues, that
the distance between the signs at issue is less than that between the signs in the
aforementioned Board of Appeal decision.
Considering all the above, in particular, the stronger impact of the visual dissimilarity
of the marks in relation to the relevant goods, even assuming that these goods are
identical, there is no likelihood of confusion on the part of the public. Therefore, the
opposition must be rejected.
COSTS
According to Article 109(1) EUTMR, the losing party in opposition proceedings must
bear the fees and costs incurred by the other party.
Since the opponent is the losing party, it must bear the costs incurred by the
applicant in the course of these proceedings.
According to Article 109(7) EUTMR and Article 18(1)(c)(i) EUTMIR (former Rule 94(3)
and Rule 94(7)(d)(ii) EUTMIR, in force before 01/10/2017), the costs to be paid to the
applicant are the costs of representation, which are to be fixed on the basis of the
maximum rate set therein. In the present case, the applicant did not appoint a
professional representative within the meaning of Article 120 EUTMR and therefore
did not incur representation costs.
The Opposition Division
Helen Louise MOSBACK Elena NICOLÁS GÓMEZ Lucinda CARNEY
According to Article 67 EUTMR, any party adversely affected by this decision has a
right to appeal against this decision. According to Article 68 EUTMR, notice of appeal
must be filed in writing at the Office within two months of the date of notification of
this decision. It must be filed in the language of the proceedings in which the decision
subject to appeal was taken. Furthermore, a written statement of the grounds for

Decision on Opposition No B 2 509 902 page: 9 of 9
appeal must be filed within four months of the same date. The notice of appeal will be
deemed to have been filed only when the appeal fee of EUR 720 has been paid.

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